What happiness science can learn from John Stuart Mill

Authors

  • Willem van der Deijl Erasmus University Rotterdam

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5502/ijw.v6i1.464

Keywords:

Qualitative hedonism, Subjective Well-Being, John Stuart Mill, Measurement of Happiness

Abstract

Many researchers studying subjective wellbeing (SWB) understand SWB as a concept that is close to Bentham’s notion of happiness. This conception of happiness is philosophically controversial, because it treats pleasure as a homogenous experience. I analyze an important deviation from Bentham in John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism and its relevance for SWB research: qualitative differences in pleasurable experiences. I argue that in cases where lives involving qualitatively different experiences are compared, Mill’s qualitative perspective is incompatible with an important assumption in the SWB literature: that happiness can be meaningfully rated by people on a scale. I illustrate the problem by means of the question of whether becoming a parent makes people happier. I analyze whether the problem can be avoided on alternative views of happiness, but argue that on all plausible accounts of happiness, the problem persists. I conclude that the problem it poses for self-reported happiness is genuine and should be acknowledged by SWB researchers. I end by discussing the ways in which this conclusion can help the study of happiness move forward.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Willem van der Deijl, Erasmus University Rotterdam

PhD student at the Faculty of Philosophy, and the Erasmus School of Economics

Downloads

Published

2016-05-14

Issue

Section

Articles